The paper analyzes dollarization in the sense of asset substitution, where a foreign currency competes with local assets, especially domestic capital, as a store of value, the impact of dollarization on capital accumulation and output, and why economies remain dollarized long after a successful inflation stabilization. We relate this dollarization hysteresis to a financial intermediation failure that happens during high inflation. We show that in dollarized countries, inflation stabilization policies may not have any effect on domestic capital accumulation, thus preventing such policies from stimulating growth-i.e. dollarized economies are vulnerable to "dollarization traps".
Introduction
Unofficial 'dollarization' has become a pervasive phenomenon in many emerging market economies.
Discussions of the dollarization phenomenon have often focused on either official dollarization, where a government abandons the domestic currency and replaces it with a "hard" foreign currency (such as the U.S. dollar) or on unofficial currency substitution, i.e. the competition between US dollars and the domestic currency as a medium of exchange. In this paper, we focus on unofficial dollarization in the sense of asset substitution, where a foreign currency competes with local assets, especially domestic capital, as a store of value. The paper assesses the impact of dollarization on capital accumulation, a topic that has been neglected in the dollarization literature.
It is well understood and documented that economies become dollarized during episodes of high inflation. However, disinflations are not necessarily followed by dedollarization. In particular, Argentina, Bolivia, Peru, Russia, Ukraine and other countries have remained highly dollarized long after the inflation rate was brought down to single digits. In Figure 1 we present some data on dollarization ratios and inflation rates for eight countries over various intervals of time. Here dollarization is measured as the ratio of foreign currency bank deposits to M2 and inflation is represented by percentage changes in the consumer price index. 1 As Figure 1 shows, these eight countries all experienced significant disinflations over the period illustrated, yet the dollarization ratio remained stubbornly high or even rose over the same period.
-Insert Figure 1 hereDollarization includes not only foreign currency deposits, but also holdings of US dollar bills by residents of the country. In table 1 we present data on the cumulative dollarization index (CDI) compiled by Feige (2003) for selected countries of the former Soviet Union in 2001. CDI takes into account estimates of foreign currency holdings and is measured as the share of the foreign exchange assets (the sum of the estimate of foreign currency holdings and foreign currency bank deposits) in the broad money supply (the sum of M2 and the estimate of foreign currency holdings). Even though the annual inflation rate in most of these countries had been brought down to single digits, foreign currency and foreign currency deposits made up more than half of the broad money supply.
Furthermore, CDI values were significantly higher than the conventionally measured dollarization index (the ratio of foreign currency bank deposits to M2). Table 1 hereThis paper presents a new explanation of the dollarization hysteresis paradox. We relate it to the underdevelopment of the financial system or a financial intermediation failure that happens during a period of high inflation. The link between financial underdevelopment and dollarization has been noted in several descriptive papers, but it has never been modeled explicitly. In our model high inflation undermines financial intermediation, leading to the adoption of a less efficient production technology, which in turn makes a dollarization trap possible. In this trap arbitrage equates the return on productive capital and dollars. Hence the exogenously given return on dollars pins down the return on productive capital, and hence makes the capital stock and output independent of inflation. A disinflation increases holdings of dollars rather than the capital stock. Rising dollarization despite falling inflation is a counterintuitive result which is nevertheless consistent with empirical evidence of several Latin American and transition economies. The only way to exit from such a trap is to reduce inflation below a threshold level.
-Insert
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related literature.
Section 3 begins with an overview of the model and its predictions followed by specific details of the model. Section 4 discusses production technologies. Section 5 discusses steady-state equilibria and transitional dynamics. Section 6 considers the effects of inflation and disinflation on the equilibrium. Section 7 offers concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Related Literature
As noted above, discussions of the dollarization phenomenon have focused in the first instance on official dollarization, where a government abandons the domestic currency and replaces it with a "hard" foreign currency (such as the U.S. dollar). 2 In the second instance, discussions of dollarization have focused on unofficial currency substitution, i.e. competition between US dollars and the domestic currency as a medium of exchange. The literature on currency substitution has been concerned with issues of real money demand, optimal money growth, the inflation tax and real exchange rate movements in the context of endowment, infinitely-lived representative agent models.
Different authors adopt different money demand specifications. 3 Vegh (1995) and Sturzenegger (1997) are the only ones who explicitly model the production side of the economy. However, in their models labor is the only input, and so there is no substitution between productive capital and dollars.
We focus on unofficial dollarization in the sense of asset substitution, where a foreign currency competes with local assets, especially domestic capital, as a store of value. Our approach to dollarization is consistent with Calvo's (1996, Chapter 8, p. 153 ) useful definition; he defines currency substitution as "the use of foreign currency as a means of exchange" and dollarization as "the use of foreign currency in any of its three functions: unit of account, means of exchange, and, in particular, store of value." (emphasis added).
Consistent with the evidence presented above, it is well understood and documented that economies become dollarized during episodes of high inflation, but disinflations are not necessarily followed by dedollarization. 4 The dollarization hysteresis paradox has been addressed using three different approaches.
The first approach is to modify existing currency substitution models to include adjustment costs or network externalities. Oomes (2003) , Cuddington and Garcia (2002) , Guidotti and Rodriguez (1992) and Uribe (1997) develop models in which the cost of using a foreign currency for transactions negatively depends on the share of market participants who use this currency. Once the economy gets dollarized, there is no benefit for an individual market participant to switch back to using domestic currency as long as other participants continue to use dollars. The limitation of this approach is that it explains the use of a foreign currency as a medium of exchange but not as a store of value. However, it is the store-of-value function of money, and not the medium of exchange role that accounts for the billions of dollars kept "under the mattress" in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, in most of these countries firms and proprietors are obliged by law to accept only domestic currency, which limits the use of dollars as a medium of exchange to nonmarket exchanges and the shadow economy.
The second approach is to explain dollarization hysteresis as arising from a lack of confidence in domestic monetary assets, resulting from past inflations, devaluations or bank failures (Feige, 2003) .
This approach hinges on the assumption that economic agents possibly make systematic mistakes by holding dollars "under the mattress" and forfeiting a higher return on domestic monetary instruments. The "peso problem" as a potential explanation of dollarization hysteresis is inconsistent with the very strong macroeconomic fundamentals in several of these countries (including Peru and Russia in the early 2000s).
The third approach, "financial dollarization" due to Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003) , explains dollarization of the balance sheets of domestic banks as an optimal response to exchange rate and inflation risk. In Ize and Levy Yeyati's asset market model, currency choice is determined on both sides of a bank's balance sheet by the need to hedge against inflation and foreign exchange risk.
They find that the equilibrium gravitates towards the minimum variance portfolio allocation, i.e. they explain dollarization using the second moments (i.e., volatility) of inflation and real exchange rate depreciation, rather than using the first moments (i.e., expected inflation and depreciation). 5 Dollarization levels can remain high, in spite of disinflationary policies, if the expected volatility of the inflation rate is high in relation to the volatility of the real exchange rate.
There are some limitations to this financial dollarization literature. First, it takes the banking system as given, and is therefore unable to compare the degree of dollarization in economies with different levels of financial development. Second, it does not incorporate the banking system into a general equilibrium framework, and does not study the impact of financial dollarization on the broad macroeconomy. Finally, dollarization hysteresis is observed in several countries with high real exchange rate volatility, notably, Russia.
As noted above, this paper presents a fourth, alternative explanation of the dollarization hysteresis paradox that is built on a financial intermediation failure that happens during the period of high inflation. The link between financial underdevelopment and dollarization has been noted in several descriptive papers, but it has never been modeled explicitly. For example, Savastano (1996, 5 See also Broda and Levy Yeyati (2003) , who focus on the liability side of the bank balance sheet and show that banks may have an incentive to attract dollar deposits above the socially optimal level. In their model the currency mismatch is the only source of bank default (all loans are denominated in pesos, the domestic currency, and banks default in the case of large devaluation shock), but the dollar depositors share the burden of default with peso depositors. Hence the banks have a preference for dollar liabilities, because the peso-dollar spread priced by risk-neutral depositors exceeds the effective relative cost of dollar liabilities for the bank.
p. 226) argues that "the relative importance of foreign currency as an inflation hedge will be inversely related to the economy's level of financial development. An economy with a well-developed financial market is, in principle, capable of adapting rapidly to a high inflation environment by offering a rich set of fairly liquid, high-yield instruments denominated in domestic currency ('near monies') that preserve the real value of the public's portfolio." Chile and, especially, Brazil are examples of countries that went through periods of high inflation in the 1970s -1990s, but avoided dollarization. These two economies arguably have the most sophisticated banking systems in the South America. Furthermore, Feige (2003) observes that in economies in transition all measures of dollarization are negatively correlated with the EBRD index of banking reform, which is an indirect measure of financial development.
Besides addressing the dollarization hysteresis paradox, our paper overcomes several limitations of the existing literature on dollarization. There is very little research on substitution between dollar denominated assets and domestic assets other than money. 6 This is surprising, since the use of foreign currency (dollars) as a store of value usually precedes the use of foreign currency as a medium of exchange Vegh, 1992, Heymann and Leijonhufvud, 1995) . Another serious limitation of the current dollarization literature is that it neglects the real effects of dollarization.
Specifically, most existing models analyze dollarization in the context of endowment economies; none of them studies the interaction between dollarization and physical capital accumulation.
The Model

Overview of the Model and its Main Predictions
We use a three-period overlapping generations model in which agents save during the first two periods and consume in the final period. In their first period of life, we assume that agents must save exclusively using domestic currency which can then be used in the second period to purchase dollars and capital (a type of cash-in-advance constraint). 7 Thus, an increase in domestic inflation will 6 Several papers, including Kareken and Wallace (1981) , Chang (1994) , Sibert and Liu (1998) , Tandon and Wang (1999) , Mourmouras and Russell (2000) , analyze substitution between domestic and foreign money in the context of endowment overlapping-generations models. In those models, both competing monies serve as a store of value. The focus of this literature is on relative money demand, inflationary finance of a given budget deficit and capital controls that governments (may) impose to protect the seigniorage base.
7 We adopt a three-period OLG setup in order to derive a positive demand for real money balances and so that an increase in the steady state inflation rate reduces the capital stock and output. However, there exist a variety of alternative setups in which the same result can be attained. For instance, we could have set up a model with spatial separation and limited communication similar to Champ, Smith and Williamson (1996) , Smith (1997, 1998) and Espinosa-Vega and Yip (1999) . A version of the paper with this alternative setup and reduce a middle-aged individual's ability to purchase capital goods, giving us a negative relationship between inflation and the capital stock. This is our first critical assumption, and the motivation for it is discussed next.
In light of empirical evidence, any monetary growth model should have the prediction that a rise in the steady state inflation rate (above a certain threshold) is associated with a reduction (possibly non-linear) in the domestic capital stock and domestic output, precisely the reverse of the "Mundell-Tobin" effect (see Barro (1996) , Bruno (1995) , Chari et al. (1995) , Fischer (1993) , Ghosh and Phillips (1998) , Senhadji (2001), and Sarel (1996) ). As Gale (1983, p. 85) observes, "In an important sense, Tobin appears to have got his results backwards. When the economy is modeled 'properly' -and what this means is bound to be controversial -the Tobin effect is reversed." Our model has this prediction.
However, as long as the production function exhibits diminishing marginal returns, a reduction in the capital stock leads to a rise in the real return to domestic capital, which in turn results in a shift away from investment in dollars and toward capital. This "arbitrage problem" clearly contradicts the empirical evidence on dollarization in high inflation economies; i.e. high inflation tends to raise the demand for dollars.
To address this arbitrage problem we make a second critical assumption. Specifically, we assume a non-convexity in production: when the aggregate capital stock is sufficiently high, the scale of production allows for an efficient, modern financial intermediation technology with a marginal rate of return to capital that is higher than in the unintermediated "primitive" technology that prevails under lower capital stocks. The primitive technology is directly accessible to agents but may offer a lower rate of return than the efficient technology. There is a fixed cost to operating the efficient technology. We model this fixed cost as the cost associated with running a financial center that is a necessary precondition to operate the efficient technology, but alternative interpretations are possible and do not affect the results (e.g. agents might access the efficient technology directly by paying a fixed cost to do so).
We characterize equilibria across a range of possible inflation rates (or, equivalently, monetary growth rates). At sufficiently low rates of inflation the capital stock is high and the efficient technology is used. As the inflation rate increases, the capital stock falls for the reason discussed qualitatively identical findings is available from the authors upon request. The disadvantage of the spatial-separationand-limited-communication framework is that it requires more restrictions on the utility function and on the allocation of seigniorage than the framework adopted in this version of the paper.
above. We show that there exists an inflation rate threshold such that for inflation rates above this threshold it is unprofitable to operate the financial center, and thus also the efficient technology. The reason is that at this high, threshold inflation rate the capital stock is sufficiently low that payment of the fixed cost of operating the financial center with its efficient technology is no longer profitable; we interpret this as an endogenous financial intermediation failure. The switch in technologies at a threshold inflation rate results in a decrease in the marginal product of capital. If the decrease in the marginal product of capital is large enough then agents will demand dollars, which will then result in the marginal product of capital being pinned down by the return on dollars. We show that there will be a range of inflation rates such that variations in the inflation rate within this range have no effect on the capital stock as it is pinned down by the arbitrage condition that capital and dollars must have the same return. We refer to this situation as a dollarization trap.
The relationship between the capital stock and the inflation rate is therefore non-linear. This feature of the model is broadly consistent with theoretical and empirical work that shows that inflation negatively affects financial intermediation activities, and that the relationship between inflation and financial development may be highly nonlinear. 8
The two technologies and the fixed cost of operating the more efficient technology are key to generating a dollarization trap in our model. Unfortunately, these features considerably complicate our analysis for two reasons. One reason is that the two technologies and the fixed cost results in there being multiple equilibria for some inflation rates. A second reason is that one has to be concerned with characterizing the behavior of the financial center and the conditions under which it will be profitable to operate it. We turn now to a more complete description of the model.
The Environment
Consider a three-period lived overlapping generations model. In every period t a continuum of agents of measure 1 is born. There is no population growth. In the first period, agents are endowed with one unit of labor which they supply inelastically on the labor market receiving in exchange the perfectly competitive market wage, w t . They derive utility from consumption of the single, perishable good in the last (the third) period of life only. The only restriction we impose on the utility function is that it depends positively on consumption. There exist three kinds of assets to transfer wealth across time: domestic currency, productive capital, and dollars. Agents regard dollars and capital as perfect substitutes. Henceforth we will refer to them both as capital market assets (CMA). We assume that there is no inflation of dollars, and that purchasing power parity holds. Therefore, the gross return from holding dollars is always unity. We restrict our attention to equilibria in which the return on domestic currency is lower than the return on dollars and capital.
In other words, we abstract from deflation and liquidity traps here.
To motivate positive demand for domestic currency, we assume that domestic currency must be held for at least one period prior to the purchase of CMA. Therefore, agents hold the currency between the first and the second period of life, and invest in CMA at the end of the second period of life. This assumption is analogous to a cash-in-advance constraint. In our model it is the purchase of capital market assets, rather than consumption goods, that are subject to a cash-in-advance constraint.
There is a government that prints money (a.k.a. domestic currency) at the beginning of every period and gives the seigniorage as lump-sum transfers to domestic agents. We assume that the share of the young agents (in the aggregate transfer) is τ 1 ≥ 0, the share of the middle-age agents is τ 2 ≥ 0, and the share of the old is 1 − τ 1 − τ 2 > 0. The gross growth rate of nominal money supply is constant each period and is denoted ρ. Hence M t = ρM t−1 . In the steady state the gross inflation factor equals ρ.
The government earns real seigniorage revenue in period t in the amount:
where P t is the price level in period t, m t = Mt P T is real money demand (equal to real money supply in equilibrium), and S t is real seigniorage. The last equality follows from our assumption that young agents' savings of wage income, w t , and transfers, τ 1 S t , are held in domestic money until their second period of life. Solving for S t yields:
There exist two productive technologies. One technology is more efficient, but it requires some kind of financial intermediation-henceforth called a "financial center"-that can be operated only at a fixed cost. The financial center can be thought of as a stock market, a bank, or any other technology (e.g. computer center, power plant, infrastructure), that enables an economy to operate at the frontiers of its production possibilities. The efficient technology yields output in per capita terms, y = Ak α − φ, where k is the capital stock per worker, A > 0 and α ∈ (0, 0.5) are technology parameters, and φ is the cost to operate the financial center. For simplicity, we abstract from exogenous technological progress and endogenous growth. Capital depreciates fully each period.
We assume that the financial center is a joint-stock company owned by prospective investors, the middle-aged agents. However, it is run as an independent profit-maximizing firm, and hence it operates only if it makes a non-negative profit. 9 The profit is rebated to the owners in the following period, i.e. when the investment matures. Below we present two assumptions on the production technology that ensure that no more than one center can make a profit in the economy-i.e. the financial center is a monopoly. 10
In section 4 we show that Assumption 1 ensures a positive relationship between the profit of the financial center and its scale of operations. The corollary of Assumption 1 is that the efficient production technology is dynamically efficient, i.e., Aαk α−1 > 1. The purpose of this assumption is simply that, when the efficient technology is used, the return on capital is greater than the return on dollars and thus the financial center never invests in dollars. We view this as a weak restriction on the efficient production technology.
The purpose of the second assumption is to rule out the possibility of more than one financial center from arising. This has no bearing on the results, as the market structure of the banking center has no effect on the real allocation (this is discussed below). This assumption serves only to simplify our exposition as we need only consider the decision problem of a single financial center.
The other "primitive" technology is costless to operate and does not require a financial center, (i.e., the agents can use it directly) but it is less productive than the financial center technology;
the "primitive technology" yields output in per capita terms equal to y = Aγk α , where γ < 1. If the primitive technology is used, the capital also depreciates fully in every period.
It is important to note that the critical assumption is that there is a fixed cost to operate the efficient technology. We emphasize that the monopoly position of the financial center has no role in the main results; economywide savings and capital accumulation (the financial center invests all deposits in capital) are not affected by the market structure or pricing decisions of the financial center. To see why, note first that the financial center decides on the rate of remuneration for depositors (agents in their second period of life). However, the level of saving in both the first and second period of life is not affected by the return on saving-because agents consume only in their third period of life and thus savings is completely inelastic-unaffected by monopolistic position of the financial center. Hence, the capital stock is also unaffected by the pricing decisions of the financial center. 11
While the monopolistic financial center is not important for our results, we have two main reasons for interpreting the fixed cost in this way. First, the fixed cost-which is crucial for our results-gives rise to increasing returns and thus creates an environment where there is a tendency for a monopoly to arise. Second, we believe that the interpretation of the fixed cost as the cost of a financial center is not unrealistic. Real-world financial institutions, including stock markets, bond markets, and banks exhibit economies of scale that explain very high degree of concentration in the financial system. 12 A fixed cost to operate the financial center is the simplest way to model those real-world economies of scale in financial intermediation.
The Financial Center
If it operates, the financial center is run as an independent, profit-maximizing, monopoly enterprise.
It attracts the deposits of middle-aged agents, and pays these agents just the amount they would earn on their own using only the primitive technology and dollars. We assume that the agents resolve their indifference between using the primitive technology and dollars or the financial center by investing all of their savings (CMA) with the financial center whenever the financial center is in operation. 13 If the financial center does not operate, individuals must decide how to allocate their CMA between the primitive technology and dollars. We refer to the portfolio of CMA that agents consider investing in the primitive technology and dollars as their "autarkic portfolio"; the amount of this portfolio will be denoted by p t .
11 In fact, agents' wealth is also unaffected by the monopolistic financial center because they have equal ownership of the center, if it operates.
12 Even large economies typically have just one major stock exchange. Large firms from small countries often list their stocks on these exchanges, because their domestic stock markets are too small and/or underdeveloped.
13 Alternatively, we could add a small premium to the return offered by the center to the agents without changing any of our results.
Consider the return on the autarkic portfolio-the return that individuals earn regardless of whether the financial center operates or not. There are two cases, corresponding to whether the return on capital using the primitive technology is greater than or equal to the return on dollars.
If capital dominates dollars in the rate of return, dollars are not present in the autarkic portfolio.
Otherwise, both capital and dollars are included in the portfolio, and the return on both assets is equalized by arbitrage. Next we consider each of these cases in turn.
Return on Capital Equals the Return on Dollars
In the case where the return on capital equals the return on dollars and the financial center does not operate, agents hold both capital and dollars in the autarkic portfolio. The autarkic portfolio involves investment in capital up to the point where the gross marginal product of capital is unity, the same as the marginal return on dollars:
where k T R is the capital stock per worker. We denote the capital stock as k T R , because this is the level of the capital stock in the dollarization trap (TR stands for "trap"). Specifically, as will become clear below, in the dollarization trap the return on capital and dollars is equalized; k T R is the level of capital in such a case. Solving for k T R yields:
Thus, the case where the agents' autarkic portfolio of CMA consists of both capital and dollars arises whenever p > k T R ; the amount of dollars in the portfolio is the residual amount, p − k T R .
The total return on autarkic portfolio p is:
and hence the gross rate of return on this portfolio is unity.
In the case where the return on capital equals the return on dollars and the financial center is in operation, agents deposit their savings with the financial center, which in turn pays the agents a gross rate of return equal to 1. The cost of setting up the financial center is φ (in per capita terms). Figure 2 illustrates the revenue and the expenses of the financial center. The total return on capital,
i.e., the revenue of the center is given by Aαk α , while k + φ are the expenditures of the center.
Therefore, given that the financial center invests only in capital (this follows from Assumption 1), the center's profit in per capita terms is:
The financial center operates so long as Π d ≥ 0, and shuts down whenever Π d becomes negative.
Profit is non-negative when revenue is no less than the expenditures, i.e., k * ≤ k ≤ k * * , where k * and k * * are the smaller and the larger roots of the equation Aαk α = k + φ, respectively. Finally,
is the point where profit is maximized.
Assumption 1 ensures that Aα
In words, this assumption says that we restrict our attention to the range of values of k, where the profit of the financial center positively depends on its scale of operation. As noted above, we do not believe this is a restrictive assumption since all it rules out is instances where the return on capital with the efficient technology is equal to the return on dollars (ie. a net return of zero).
Assumption 2 can be rewritten as:
It ensures that two (or more) financial centers are not able to make a profit in this economy.
However, the profit of a single financial center is positive at its maximum point k m . Therefore, the equation Aαk α − k − φ = 0 has two positive real roots, and
Hence these two assumptions ensure that the financial center makes a nonnegative profit and operates only when the capital stock is sufficiently high (and when the inflation rate is low, see section 4), and shuts down when the capital stock is too low.
Therefore, the financial center operates, if p ≥ k * , and shuts down if p < k * .
Return on Capital Exceeds Return on Dollars
When p ≤ k T R , the autarkic portfolio of CMA contains no dollars, as the gross return on capital using the primitive technology, Aαγk α−1 , is greater than or equal to unity. The financial center, if it operates, invests in capital only. Its revenue is the return on capital using the efficient technology, Aαk α , and its expenditures equal the sum of the return on the autarkic portfolio (paid to depositors) and the cost of operating the financial center, Aαγk α + φ. Therefore, the profit of the financial center is:
The financial center operates if and only if Π ≥ 0, or
Comparison among k * , k T R andk * yields the following three possibilities:
Only in case A can the autarkic portfolio contain dollars, and so that a dollarization trap is a possibility. If p < k * , the financial center shuts down, but dollars are held in the autarkic portfolio as long as p > k T R . In cases B and C, i.e. when k * ≤ k T R , the financial center shuts down only if p <k * < k T R In that case the autarkic portfolio contains productive capital only.
The findings of this subsection are summarized as follows: 
the financial center operates if and only if
p ≥ k * . If k * ≤ k T R ,
Competitive Equilibrium and Steady States
This section identifies three possible equilibria that can arise in our model: 1) the financial center operates using the efficient technology and does not invest in dollars, 2) the financial center does not operate and agents invest using the primitive technology but do not hold dollars, and 3) the financial center does not operate and agents invest using the primitive technology and dollars.
Equilibrium with the Efficient Technology
Six equations determine the competitive equilibrium of this economy when the efficient technology is used:
where c t is the consumption of the old (third period of life) agent in period t 14 , π t is the gross inflation factor between periods t − 1 and t. Six equations (6)- (11) Equation (9) takes advantage of the fact that the old agents split the return on capital and consume all their revenue net of the intermediation cost φ. Moreover, an old agent gets (1 − τ 1 − τ 2 ) share of the seigniorage, which is also consumed. Equation (10) is the aggregate resource constraint.
Equation (11) is the transformed budget constraint of the middle-aged agent,
After substituting (6) for w t , (7) for S t and inserting (9) into (10), we get a single first-order difference equation:
or, after some simplification,
. For a given value of ρ, ψ is a positive constant. Hence the dynamical properties of equation (12) are the same as the properties of the standard Diamond (1965) model.
In particular, it has a unique and stable positive steady state.
Lemma 2 The dynamical equation (12) has a unique positive steady state, k = ψ 1/(1−α) . This steady state is stable.
The following proposition establishes the main comparative statics result of this subsection.
Proposition 2 If the financial center operates, an increase in the steady-state money supply growth rate reduces the per capita capital stock.
The comparative statics result is illustrated in Figure 3 . An increase in ρ reduces the constant
and hence shifts the graph of (12) 
The use of the financial center implies that p = k, as agents deposit all their middle-age wealth with the center. Hence k ≥ k * is the necessary and sufficient condition for the operation of the financial center in the case k * > k T R , and k ≥k * is the necessary and sufficient condition in the
Consider both cases separately. First suppose that k * > k T R . The inverse relationship between k and ρ, dynamical equation (12) 
where:
The right-hand side of (13) is obtained by solving the steady-state version of (12) for ρ and substituting k * for k.
Second, suppose k * ≤ k T R. The equilibrium exists if and only if:
Note that whether k * is greater than or less than k T R is a parametric restriction and thus only one of the sets [1, ρ * ] and [1,ρ * ] is relevant for any given parameterization.
Equilibrium with the Primitive Technology and No Dollars
Six equations determine the competitive equilibrium of this economy when the inefficient technology is used:
The system (15)- (20) is almost identical to the system (10)- (15). Given that the inefficient technology is used, equations (15), (18) and (19) contain the coefficient γ. The other difference is the absence of the intermediation cost φ in the consumption equation (18) 
Analogously to the case when the efficient technology is used, the dynamical properties of the difference equation (21) are the same as the properties of the standard Diamond (1965) model. In particular, it has a unique and stable positive steady state.
Lemma 3 The dynamical system (21) has a unique, positive steady state, k
.
This steady state is stable.
The following proposition establishes the main comparative statics result of this subsection. 
Consider both cases separately. If k * > k T R (case A), the inverse relationship between k and ρ, dynamical equation (21) 
The right-hand side of (22) is obtained by solving the steady-state version of (21) for ρ and substituting k T R for k.
If k * ≤ k T R (cases B-C), the primitive-technology-no-dollars steady-state equilibrium exists if and only if:
Equilibrium with the Primitive Technology and Dollars
A steady state equilibrium with dollars can exist only if k T R < k * . Otherwise, the financial center starts operating at a capital stock below k T R . The dynamics of the model are described by the following equations:
where d t is the stock of dollars accumulated in period t. Equation (28) is the budget constraint of the old agent. It states that he has two sources of revenue to finance his consumption: the return on CMA (gross return equal to one) and the seigniorage. Equation (29) 
Proposition 4 In the dollarization trap equilibrium, disinflation increases dollar holdings.
A disinflation (a reduction in ρ) raises the right-hand side of (29), because the increase in the real value of the money holdings of the middle-aged, m π , offsets the reduction in the transfer from the government, τ 2 S. Hence the left-hand side rises as well, and therefore the dollar holdings, d also go up.
Next we calculate the values of ρ compatible with this dollarization trap equilibrium. The lowest possible money growth rate-denoted as ρ 2 -makes the right-hand side of (29) equal to k * , i.e., saving is sufficiently high that p = k * which induces a switch back to the efficient technology.
. Using this notation, ρ 2 is defined implicitly by the following modification of (29):
Solving for ρ 2 yields:
Similarly, the highest possible money growth rate-denoted as ρ 1 -consistent with this equilibrium makes the right-hand side of (29) equal to k T R (zero demand for dollars). Algebraically,
Solving for ρ 1 yields:
We know that ρ 1 > ρ 2 , because the right-hand side of (29) is monotonically decreasing in ρ.
Hence it attains the lower value, k T R , at a higher level of the steady state inflation rate, than the higher value, k * . We conclude the subsection with the following lemma.
Lemma 5 ρ * > ρ 1 > 1.
Lemma 5 ensures that the dollarization trap occurs in the relevant range of values of ρ, that is, dollarization traps are only possible at sufficiently high rates of growth of the money stock and inflation. 15
Summary
There are two different cases depending on whether k T R is greater than, less than, or equal to, k * .
Case A. k * > k T R . All three equilibria are feasible, and there may be multiple equilibria for a range of the money supply growth rate. Specifically, if ρ ∈ (1, ρ 2 ), only the efficient-technology equilibrium exists. If ρ ∈ [ρ 2 , ρ 1 ) both the efficient-technology steady state and the steady state with the inefficient technology and dollars are possible. For ρ ∈ [ρ 1 , ρ * ) there exist two steady equilibria:
the efficient-technology equilibrium and the inefficient-technology-no-dollars equilibrium. Finally, for ρ ≥ ρ * the only equilibrium is with the inefficient technology and no dollars. Thus, the range of the gross inflation factor values [ρ 2 , ρ * ] is compatible with two different steady-state equilibria. Figure 4 illustrates this case.
Case B-C. k T R ≥ k * . The inefficient-technology-and-dollars equilibrium is not feasible. If ρ ≤ρ * , the efficient-technology equilibrium exists. If ρ ≥ρ 2 , the primitive-technology-no-dollars equilibrium exists. Therefore the range of the gross inflation factor values [ρ 2 , ρ * ] is compatible with two different steady-state equilibria, one of which uses the efficient technology and one which uses the inefficient technology (and no dollars). Figure 5 illustrates this case.
Dynamics of Inflation and Disinflation
Qualitative Features of a Dollarization Trap
A dollarization trap arises only if k * > k T R . In this case, assume that inflation is low, but rising.
The economy starts at point A and gradually moves to point B as shown in Figure 6 . Along the way the efficient technology is used, but the capital stock is falling due to higher inflation. Any temporary deviation from the steady state equilibrium dies out, because steady states are stable.
If the inflation rate exceeds ρ * , a bifurcation takes place. The financial center shuts down, and agents have to use the primitive technology instead. The economy "jumps" from point B to point C in Figure 4 . Along the trajectory D-F, there is still a negative relationship between the inflation rate and the capital stock. Therefore, a disinflation raises the capital stock abovek, the level of capital stock at C. However, if the inflation rate falls below ρ 1 , the investment and output recovery halts. The economy is stuck in a trap, where the level of the capital stock is completely pinned down by the return on dollars. Disinflation translates not into a larger capital investment, but into larger dollar holdings. Hence our model is consistent with the empirical evidence that falling inflation sometimes coexists with a rising dollarization. Only when the inflation rate falls to a sufficiently low level, ρ 2 , does another bifurcation take place, the financial center resumes operations, and the capital stock "jumps" from k T R to k 2 .
It is important to note that because of the multiplicity and stability of equilibria, the level of the capital stock (and output) during the initial period of disinflation is lower than the comparable level during rising inflation (for the same inflation rate). Moreover, as the disinflation progresses (as the economy moves from D to E), the gap rises and reaches its maximum when the inflation rate falls to ρ 2 .
Dollarization Traps and Financial Development
What factors affect the likelihood of a dollarization trap? The trap arises only if k * > k T R , therefore
anything that serves to reduce the value of k * relative to k T R makes the trap less likely, and indeed if k * fals below k T R the trap is impossible. The following lemma asserts that a reduction in the per capita intermediation cost φ lowers k * , but it does not affect k T R .
Lemma 6
∂k * ∂φ > 0.
In Figure 2 , a reduction in φ shifts the expenditure line of the financial center, k + φ, downward and hence the point of intersection of this line with the revenue curve, Aαk α , shifts to the left. As k * falls, the condition k * > k T R is less likely to be satisfied. In other words, the likelihood of a dollarization trap is reduced. This finding is very intuitive. Intermediation costs, φ. are inversely related to the level of financial development. Therefore, a more developed financial system makes a dollarization trap less likely. As φ → 0, we have k * → 0 as well, and the dollarization trap becomes impossible.
Conclusion
This paper studies the link between inflation, the demand for foreign currency, or "dollars," as a store of value, and capital accumulation. Our principal aim in the paper is to identify circumstances which can explain key empirical facts in dollarized countries. These empirical facts are that inflation is a main cause of dollarization, that dollarization coincides with adverse real economic performance, and that both the level of dollarization and the performance of the real economy may be very slow to reverse following a stabilization of inflation.
The key assumption in the paper is that the efficiency of the production technology depends positively on the level of capital accumulation. This assumption appears in slightly different form in various endogenous growth models. In our model, this assumption is critical for explaining dollarization hysteresis. The reason is that, to be consistent with the stylized facts in dollarized economies, a sufficiently high inflation rate must reduce the marginal product of capital, decrease capital accumulation, and induce a higher demand for dollars. This is impossible if there is a single neoclassical production technology. First, consider the case when both k * andk * are smaller than k T R . We know that Π d > Π for
Second, consider the case when both k * andk * are greater than k T R . We know that
Third, we show the impossibility of the case k * < k T R <k * . If this inequality were true,
Therefore, k * >k * . This is a contradiction. The impossibility of the casek * < k T R < k * can be shown in a similar way.
Fourth, we show that ifk
Finally, we show that if k T R equals either k * , ork * , then it equals the other critical value as well. Suppose that k T R = k * (the case when k T R =k * can be proved in a similar way). Then,
Therefore, k T R is the root of Π(k) = 0, and k T R =k * . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2.
In the steady state k = ψk α . This equation has two roots: k = 0 and k = ψ 1/(1−α) > 0.
To prove stability, we can show that
∂kt evaluated at the steady state is smaller than unity by absolute value.
Proof of Proposition 2. ∂k ∂ρ = ∂k ∂ψ ∂ψ ∂ρ ;
Proofs of Lemma 3 and Proposition 3 mirror the proofs of Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 and are omitted.
Proof of Lemma 4.
Arbitrage between productive capital and dollars ensures that the capital stock per worker equals k T R not only in the steady state, but also in a neighborhood of the steady state. By equations (24) and (27), the wage rate and per capita consumption are also equal to their steady state values. Equations (25) and (26) ensure the same for the seigniorage revenue of the government, S t , and the money holdings, m t , as long as the wage rate is at its steady state level. Equation (28) guarantees the equality of the dollar holdings to their steady state value. Finally, equation (29) ensures that the gross inflation factor equals the gross growth rate of money supply, as long as the dollar holdings, money holdings and seigniorage are at their respective steady state levels. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4.
After substituting (24) for w t , (25) for S t , and inserting (26) into (29), the steady-state version of (29) after some manipulations becomes:
Differentiating with respect to ρ yields:
Proof of Lemma 5.
Part 1. Proof that ρ 1 < ρ * .
We will prove it by contradiction. Let's assume that ρ 1 ≥ ρ * .
Using the notation ψ(ρ)
, the steady-state version of (29) can be written
On the other hand, the steady-state version of (12) for ρ = ρ * , can be written as:
In the proof of Proposition 2 we proved that ∂ψ ∂ρ < 0. Hence the assumption ρ 1 > ρ * implies that
This result contradicts the assumption of dynamic efficiency of the efficient technology. Q.E.D.
Part 2. Proof that ρ 1 > 1.
By assumption α < 0.5. Therefore, 1 − α > α. Hence,
Totally differentiating equation (34), we get:
Therefore,
The last equation holds by Assumption 1. Q.E.D. 25 1971 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 In the steady state, the gross rate of growth of the nominal money supply, ρ, equals the gross inflation factor.
Suppose the economy starts at point A. As long as ρ, rises, the economy moves north-west.
Along the trajectory A-B the efficient technology is used, but the capital stock k falls. If the inflation rate exceeds ρ * , the financial center shuts down, and the agents switch to the primitive technology. The economy "jumps" from B to C. Along the trajectory D-F, there is a negative relationship between k and ρ. If ρ falls below ρ 1 , the economy is stuck in the dollarization trap, where k is pinned down by the return on dollars, k = k T R . When the inflation rate falls to ρ 2 , the financial center resumes operations, and the capital stock "jumps" from k T R to k 2 . If k * < k T R , recall from Lemma 1 that k * <k * < k T R , while if k * = k T R , then k T R = k * =k * .
Suppose the economy starts at point A. So long as ρ is rising, the economy moves north-west. Along this trajectory the efficient technology is used, but the capital stock k is falling. If the inflation rate exceedsρ * , the financial center shuts down, and the agents switch to the primitive technology. The economy "jumps" from B to C. Along the trajectory E-F, there is a negative relationship between k and ρ. When the inflation rate falls toρ 2 , the financial center resumes operations, and the capital stock "jumps" fromk * to k 2 . Dollars are never used, and the economy never gets stuck in the dollarization trap. 11.4 % CDI -Comprehensive Dollarization Index = = (foreign currency+foreign currency bank deposits)/(M2+foreign currency in circulation)*100 % DI -Dollarization Index = Foreign currency bank deposits / M2 * 100 % Source: Feige (2003) and Havrylyshyn and Beddies (2003) .
